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STEVEN K. GREEN*
A “Spacious Conception”:
Separationism as an Idea
Few constitutional concepts are as familiar to the averageAmerican as separation of church and state.  Most Ameri-
cans can recognize or restate the concept in its basic formula-
tion1—in contrast to other constitutional principles such as
federalism or the dreaded dormant commerce clause—and stud-
ies indicate that Americans generally support the principle of
church–state separation, though people diverge greatly on what
that principle means.2  The Supreme Court first employed the
principle in 1878 as a shorthand for the meaning of the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause3—although church–state
separation as a popular concept had been around much longer4—
and in 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education , the Court turned
the phrase into constitutional canon.5  Because Everson  was the
first modern nonestablishment case incorporating the clause
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court felt obliged to
define the principle.  There, Justice Hugo Black anointed
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law.  An earlier version of
this Article was presented at the meeting of the Association for the Study of Law,
Humanities and Culture at Syracuse University Law School, on March 17, 2006.  My
thanks to Frank Ravitch and the other members of the panel and audience for their
observations and suggestions.
1 See  News Release, First Freedom Ctr., Most Americans Conflicted on
Church–State Separation, National Survey Finds (Oct. 3, 2005). But cf.  Anna John-
son, Study:  Few Americans Know First Amendment , SFGATE.COM, Mar. 1, 2006,
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/N/a/2006/03/01/national/a055535S79.DTL
(noting that “[o]nly one in four Americans can name more than one of the five
freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment”).
2 See, e.g. , News Release, First Freedom Ctr., supra  note 1.
3 See  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
4 See  Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation , 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1667, 1672-74 (2003) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (2002)); John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fictions About the History of Separation of
Church and State , 48 J. CHURCH & ST. 15, 16-34 (2006) (discussing the history of
separationism in Europe).
5 See  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Thomas Jefferson and James Madison as the authoritative expos-
itors of the meaning of nonestablishment and free exercise of re-
ligion.6  Borrowing the phrase from an 1802 letter written by
Jefferson, Black declared:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this:  Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other . . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion.  Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.  In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by
law was intended to erect “a wall of separation between
church and State.”7
Since Everson , jurists, historians, and legal scholars have de-
bated whether the Framers of the First Amendment truly in-
tended to create a regime of church–state separation and, if so,
what that concept meant to the designers of the clause.8  Few
constitutional concepts have been more powerful, revered, or
hotly contested.  Within both the courts and the academy, debate
has raged between separationists and accommodationists over
the significance of, and the correct interpretation to be given to,
the writings of Jefferson and Madison on one hand, and contem-
porary practices suggesting a potentially more accommodating
regime on the other hand.9  The ability to capture the historical
essence of church–state separation provides the victor with com-
manding historical authority to shape public policy and opinion
and constitutional law itself.10
6 Id.  at 13 (declaring that Jefferson and Madison played “leading roles”).
7 Id.  at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds , 98 U.S. at 164).
8 See, e.g. , CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ARTHUR T. DOWNEY & EDWARD C. ROB-
ERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT:  FORMATION AND EARLY HIS-
TORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964); MARK DEWOLFE
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS:  RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); WILBUR G. KATZ, RELIGION AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1964); J.M. O’NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949); Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as Na-
tional School Board , 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1949); John Courtney Murray,
Law or Prepossessions? , 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949); Joseph M. Snee,
Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment , 1954 WASH. U. L.Q.
371.
9 See  text accompanying supra note 8 and infra note 11.
10 Justice Wiley Rutledge stated in his Everson  dissent that “[n]o provision of the
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For the first forty years following Everson , advocates of a
stricter or more secular interpretation of church–state separation
held sway in the academy and on the Court.  Influential works by
Edwin S. Gaustad, Leonard Levy, William Lee Miller, Leo Pfef-
fer, and others11 and opinions by Justices Black, Brennan, Ste-
vens, and Souter reaffirmed the Everson  interpretation of the
Establishment Clause and its history.12  Things began to change
in the mid-1980s as a new round of scholarship arose to question
the accepted historical account of the Founding period, reflecting
in part the increasingly conservative culture of the Reagan era.
In 1982, Robert L. Cord published a highly influential revisionist
history of the Religion Clauses, Separation of Church and State:
Historical Fact and Current Fiction .  Cord’s attack was twofold:
he documented early practices and perspectives that conflicted
with the accepted Everson  interpretation, and he challenged the
separationist pedigrees of Jefferson and Madison, which was
even more heretical.13  Other revisionist accounts by Gerard
Bradley, Daniel Dreisbach, Michael J. Malbin, Michael McCon-
nell, John Noonan, and Rodney Smith also challenged the Ever-
son  rendition.  All of these works relied on contemporary
statements and practices to show that the Founders did not in-
tend a regime of strict separation of church and state.14  More
recently, this new interpretation of the historical record sur-
Constitution is more closely tied to or given consent by its generating history than
the religion clause of the First Amendment.” 330 U.S. at 33 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
11 See, e.g. , EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS:  RELIGION AND THE
NEW NATION (1987); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:  RELIGION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY:
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1985); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE,
AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967); LEO PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITU-
TION:  THE COURT AS REFEREE TO CHURCH–STATE CONFRONTATION (1975).
12 See  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-16 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 646-49 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-37
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Illinois ex rel.  McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 210-12 (1948).
13 See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:  HISTORICAL
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).  An earlier revisionist monograph of a similar
theme was MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS:  THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978).
14 See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH–STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA
(1987); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW:  RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); MALBIN, supra  note 13; JOHN T. R
NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE (1987); RODNEY K.
SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION:  A CASE STUDY IN CONSTITU-
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rounding the Religion Clauses has received support from two in-
fluential works:  Philip Hamburger’s Separation of Church and
State  and Daniel Dreisbach’s Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of
Separation of Church and State .15  Like their predecessors, both
books assert that the Everson  version of church–state separation
was alien not only to contemporaries of the Founding, but also to
Jefferson and Madison themselves.  All in all, these works reflect
the increasingly common view that separation of church and state
is hostile to religion and people of faith and is inconsistent with
our constitutional traditions, a view that was popularized in Pro-
fessor Stephen Carter’s The Culture of Disbelief .16
This new accounting of the Founding period has found its way
into Supreme Court opinions as justices have battled over the
superior interpretation of the original understanding and pur-
pose of the Establishment Clause.  The two most significant deci-
sions of the 1980s that reinterpreted the Founding era were
Marsh v. Chambers17  and Lynch v. Donnelly .18  In both cases,
Chief Justice Burger eschewed relying on the established analyti-
cal standard (i.e., the Lemon  test), preferring instead to look to
“contemporaneous understanding[s]” of the Establishment
Clause and an “unambiguous and unbroken history of more than
200 years” to validate legislative chaplains and government-spon-
sored religious displays.19  While not directly disputing the Ever-
son  historical account, Chief Justice Burger offered his
alternative version, remarking that there was “an unbroken his-
tory of official acknowledgment by all three branches of govern-
ment of the role of religion in American life from at least
1789.”20
The first significant rebuttal to the Court’s longstanding inter-
pretation of the Founding period came in Justice William Rehn-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION (1987); Michael McConnell, Coercion:  The Lost Element
of Establishment , 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
15 See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARA-
TION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); HAMBURGER, supra note 4.
16 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF:  HOW AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
17 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
18 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
19 See id.  at 673; Marsh , 463 U.S. at 792.  Highlighting that the First Congress
authorized the appointment of paid chaplains only three days after approving the
Bill of Rights, Chief Justice Burger concluded in Marsh  that “[c]learly the men who
wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains
and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment.”  463 U.S. at 788.
20 Lynch , 465 U.S. at 674.
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quist’s 1986 dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree .21  Relying heavily on
Cord’s analysis, Justice Rehnquist minimized Jefferson’s contri-
bution to the drafting of the Establishment Clause (Jefferson was
in France at the critical time) and distinguished the Virginia as-
sessment controversy of 1785 from the drafting of the First
Amendment (the former being a local state conflict), concluding
that there is “simply no historical foundation for the proposition
that the Framers intended to build the ‘wall of separation’ that
was constitutionalized in Everson .”22  Rather, the Founders in-
tended only for the Establishment Clause “to prohibit the estab-
lishment of a national church, and perhaps to prevent
discrimination among sects.  [Madison and Jefferson] did not see
it as requiring neutrality on the part of government between re-
ligion and irreligion,” Justice Rehnquist insisted.23
This revisionist accounting of the Founding has appeared more
frequently in recent church–state cases, forcing the Court liberals
to defend the previously dominant separationist interpretation.
Heated disagreements over the correct historical interpretation
of the Establishment Clause have taken place between Justices
Stevens and Souter on one side, and Justices Scalia and Thomas
on the other.24  Most recently in the Ten Commandments case of
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky , Scalia recounted nu-
merous religious acknowledgments made by early public offi-
cials, asserting that the Establishment Clause “was enshrined in
the Constitution’s text, and these official actions show what it
meant . . . . What is more probative of the meaning of the Estab-
21 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22 See id.  at 106 (citing THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1985)).
Although Rehnquist cited to Cord only once in his opinion, Wallace, 472 U.S. at 104
(citing CORD, supra note 13), his discussion of the drafting of the First Amendment,
the Northwest Ordinance, presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations, the treaty
with the Kaskaski Indians, and the later commentary by Story and Cooley closely
tracked the information and arguments contained in Cord. Compare id. at 92-107,
with CORD, supra note 13, at 4-47.
23 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98.  Justice Rehnquist’s polemic led Justice O’Connor to
respond in her concurrence that “[a]lthough history provides a touchstone for con-
stitutional problems, the Establishment Clause concern for religious liberty is dis-
positive here,” suggesting that important religious liberty values exist independently
of the historical experience. See id.  at 81 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
24 See, e.g. , Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000); Mitchell , 530 U.S. at
870-72 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 852-63 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
612-26 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Lee , 505 U.S. at 632-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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lishment Clause than the actions of the very Congress that pro-
posed it, and of the first President charged with observing it?”25
In a nutshell, the Court’s accommodationists argue that the ubiq-
uity of religious behavior laws, government preferences, and offi-
cial religious pronouncements 200 years ago indicates that the
Framers viewed the clause to prohibit only government coercion
of religion or, perhaps, sect preferences by law.26  And more sig-
nificantly for the Court’s originalists, this history should control
in legal disputes involving the Establishment Clause.27
Indubitably, this resurgence in historical scholarship on and off
the Court has benefited the originalist/accommodationist posi-
tion.  In one sense, accommodationists are simply giving payback
for forty years of separationist proof-texting that relied chiefly on
Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Freedom and Madison’s Memorial
and Remonstrance .28  However, both separationists and accom-
modationists have committed the same historical error:  they
have sought to validate their understanding of nonestablishment
by “discovering” and then freezing in time a notion of
church–state separation that was purportedly espoused by the
Founders and reflected in the culture at the time of the Founding.
Justice Rehnquist reflected this approach in his Wallace  dissent:
The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be
seen in its history.  As the drafters of our Bill of Rights, the
Framers inscribed the principles that control today.  Any
deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of
that Charter and will only lead to the type of unprincipled
25 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2754-55 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).  Complementing Justices Scalia and Thomas’s historical analysis has
been their penchant for an originalist interpretation of constitutional provisions—
this approach is limited to the textual language or the “intentions” of the Framers.
See  William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication , 72 VA.
L. REV. 1237, 1240 (1986) (defining interpretivism as “the judicial practice of giving
meaning to a legal text in accordance with the original purposes or intentions of
those who enacted it”).
26 See, e.g. , Lee , 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was a
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty .”). See also Rosenber-
ger , 515 U.S. at 854-56 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Madison’s writings
support a position of nonpreferential treatment of religion, but then distinguishing
Madison’s “more extreme notions of the separation of church and state,” and ob-
serving that “the views of one man do not establish the original understanding of the
First Amendment”).
27 See  Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[O]ur task would be far simpler if we returned to the original meaning of the word
‘establishment’ than it is under the various approaches this Court now uses.”).
28 See, e.g. , Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 870-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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decisionmaking that has plagued our Establishment Clause
cases since Everson .29
Justice Brennan, speaking for the separationists, advocated a
strikingly similar approach—though leading to different conclu-
sions—writing that “the line we must draw between the permissi-
ble and the impermissible is one which accords with history and
faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.  It
is a line which the Court has consistently sought to mark in its
decisions expounding the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment.”30
This shared historical approach is misguided for three reasons:
first, the record of the Founding era is so diverse, incomplete,
and unreliable that it is impossible to divine an accurate or con-
sensus understanding of church–state separation, even if one ex-
isted.  Also, the Founders’ own statements indicate that they did
not believe their interpretations of the Constitution’s provisions
carried any weight as to the meaning of the document.  Most im-
portant, however, the Founders’ conception of separationism was
dynamic and incomplete, and purposefully so.  To the Founders,
separation was an unfolding idea, not an accomplished reality .
The Founders did not believe that their recent struggle for relig-
ious freedom had been perfected; nonetheless, they were willing
to espouse an idea of separation that would take time to achieve.
Multiple notions of church–state separation, which were con-
stantly developing and being refined informed the discussion.
Although many people believed they were experiencing the ful-
lest realization of religious liberty to date, none would have
wanted to have his rights confined to the early manifestations,
particularly at such a nascent stage.  Consequently, the Founders
would have been perplexed and frustrated by the current effort
to cabin their understanding of church–state separation and to
rely on then-existing practices as evidence of what separation
meant.
This Article argues that the true historical meaning of
church–state separation can only be understood as the Founders
likely envisioned:  separation was a dynamic, unfolding idea  that
could not be explained or limited by the practices of the Found-
ing period.  Relatedly, the Founders would have eschewed reli-
29 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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ance on selective writings of any of the early leaders to establish
the meaning of the concept.  Because people proposed various
conceptions of democracy, equality, representation, and religious
liberty in the active newspaper and pamphlet campaign of the
late eighteenth century and then refined those concepts over
again, no writing or document encapsulated or froze the idea of
separation, not even Madison’s grand Memorial and
Remonstrance .
This does not mean that the views of various Founders are ir-
relevant; on the contrary, it is possible to identify broad princi-
ples that arose out of that “great public discourse,” principles
that inform modern discussions about the appropriate relation-
ship between religion and government.  However, modern-day
commentators err when they attempt to identify a true “original”
meaning of church–state separation based on historical writings
and practices.31  Instead, they need to recognize the Founders’
concept:  an unfolding, “spacious conception” that was not
bounded by any era or practice.32
Part I of this Article briefly traces some of the seventeenth and
eighteenth century notions of church–state separation that in-
formed the Founders’ understandings.  Part II recounts the dy-
namic period of disestablishment during the late eighteenth
century and considers whether the Founders likely viewed no-
tions of church–state separation and religious liberty as static
concepts.  Part III then examines three contemporary events:  the
Northwest Ordinance, the advent of legislative chaplains, and the
Thanksgiving proclamations, all three of which are regularly
cited in attempts to discredit the Everson  rendition of the
Founding.
31 Professor Hamburger makes a distinct but related comment.  He argues that
separation of church and state, as a distinct concept, was foreign to the founding
generation and that the notion of “separation” did not develop until the mid-nine-
teenth century in conjunction with Protestant opposition to Catholics and their edu-
cation system. See HAMBURGER, supra  note 4, passim .  Thus, Hamburger
acknowledges that separationism was a developing concept.
32 See  Illinois ex rel.  McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).  For an important recent study on the development of separa-
tion of church and state during the nineteenth century, see MARK DOUGLAS
MCGARVIE, ONE NATION UNDER LAW:  AMERICA’S EARLY NATIONAL STRUGGLES
TO SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE (2004).
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I
THE SEPARATIONIST IMPULSES
Those notions of church–state separation that were influential
during the Founding period can be traced chiefly to the Protes-
tant Reformation, the Enlightenment, and Whig politics.33  Ex-
pressions of disengaging secular authority from the church arose
during the Reformation.  John Calvin, in his Institutes of the
Christian Religion , wrote that the “spiritual kingdom” and the
“political kingdom . . . must always be considered separately,”
due to the “difference and unlikeliness between ecclesiastical and
civil power.”34  Yet, while most Protestant leaders such as Calvin
and Martin Luther emphasized that the church and the state
were distinct institutions with separate spheres, they viewed them
as relying on the same divine authority and engaging in comple-
mentary, reinforcing roles.  The institutional distinction between
church and state did not lead to disestablishment or any practical
sense of separation.35  Only radical reformers, such as the
Anabaptists, rejected the idea of religious establishments.
Anabaptists called for a separating wall between the regenerate
church and the corrupting world.36
Coming out of reformed Calvinism, British and American Pu-
ritans also insisted on distinct civil and religious institutions, de-
nying political authority to church leaders.  However, the
Puritans did not forswear formal establishments or government
support of religion.  Instead, they based many of their civil laws
on Biblical mandates while maintaining a system of religious as-
sessments.37  It fell to radical Separatist and short-time Baptist
Roger Williams to make the most complete argument for
church–state separation in early colonial America.38  In a now-
33 See Witte, supra  note 4, at 16-28.
34 See DREISBACH, supra  note 15, at 72 (quoting JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF R
THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (1559)).
35 Laycock, supra  note 4, at 1673 (“[I]nstitutional separation implied neither dis- R
establishment nor religious liberty.”).
36 See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPER-
IMENT 11-12 (2d ed. 2005) (citing THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF MENNO SIMONS
1496–1561, at 29, 117-20, 158-59, 190-206 (John Christian Wenger ed., Leonard
Verduin trans., 1984)); SCHLEITHEIM CONFESSION (1527), in HOWARD J. LOEWEN,
ONE LORD, ONE CHURCH, ONE HOPE, AND ONE GOD:  MENNONITE CONFESSIONS
OF FAITH IN NORTH AMERICA 79-84 (1985).
37 WITTE, supra note 36, at 24.
38 See generally EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE:  ROGER WIL-
LIAMS IN AMERICA 38-44 (1991); EDMUND S. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS:  THE
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familiar passage, Williams argued for a “wall of Separation be-
tween the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of the
world.”39  Rhode Island, the colony Williams established, would
distinguish itself from the rest of British America by rejecting a
religious establishment while achieving a high degree of separa-
tion between governmental and ecclesiastical institutions.  Al-
though Williams is now viewed as a visionary,40 his influence at
the time was limited; as William McLoughlin has noted, even
Williams’s successor as a pietistic separationist, Isaac Backus,
preferred to point to Pennsylvania as the model of religious lib-
erty, instead of “irreligious” Rhode Island.41
Even though many of the Founders were aware of this relig-
ious history, it is unlikely that they were familiar with specific
documents or writings, particularly those of Roger Williams.
Rather, the Founders gained inspiration principally from the
works of Enlightenment42 and Whig writers.43  Foremost among
Enlightenment writers for the Founding generation was John
Locke, author of the influential Second Treatise on Government
(1690) and A Letter Concerning Toleration  (1689).44  Locke’s po-
litical writings refuted the doctrine of the divine right of kings
and established a theory of a “social contract” by which people,
the ultimate sources of authority, delegated to the government
the responsibility of creating an ordered society.45  Locke’s theo-
ries stood in sharp contrast to the notion of a government based
on divine authority or that secular law is subject to religious man-
dates.  In A Letter Concerning Toleration , Locke wrote that “the
care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate. . . . [Thus]
CHURCH AND THE STATE 86-142 (1967) (discussing Williams’s theological argument
for separation of church and state).
39 GAUSTAD, supra  note 38, at 43. R
40 See HOWE, supra  note 8, at 18. R
41 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY:  THE BAPTISTS’ STRUGGLE IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1630–1833, at 257-58 (1991).
42 See  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 26 (1967) (“More directly influential in shaping the thought of the
Revolutionary generation [than classical writers] were the ideas and attitudes associ-
ated with the writings of Enlightenment rationalism.”).
43 Id.  at 34-45.
44 See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION:
THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 72-78 (1996); WITTE, supra  note 36,
at 26.
45 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 408-12 (Peter Laslett ed.,
2d ed. 1967) (1690); see also KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR:  LAW IN AMER-
ICAN HISTORY 57-58 (1989).
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the civil power ought not to prescribe articles of faith, or doc-
trines, or forms of worshipping God, by civil law.”46  Rather, “the
whole power of civil government is concerned only with men’s
civil goods, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and
has nothing whatever to do with the world to come.”47
Philip Hamburger attempts to minimize Locke’s commitment
to church–state separation by inference and omission, arguing
that despite such statements, Locke “made no direct objection to
government support for religion.”48  Using the absence  of an ex-
press statement to refute general statements to the contrary is
not good historical analysis.49  First, Locke’s writings must be
viewed in the context of their time, which was when notions of
religious toleration and a division of ecclesiastical and civil func-
tions were in their nascent stages.  Locke’s advocacy for any
form of religious and civil separation must be seen as significant,
even if his views pale in comparison to modern conceptions.50
However, even Hamburger acknowledges that Locke did envi-
sion a church “absolutely separate and distinct from the com-
monwealth,” a notion that would restrict the influence of each
institution on the other.51  The authority of the clergy cannot “in
any way be extended to civil affairs,” Locke insisted, “because
the church itself is absolutely separate and distinct from the com-
monwealth and civil affairs.  The boundaries on both sides are
fixed and immoveable.”52  The point is not whether Locke of-
fered a complete model of church–state separation, but whether
he challenged existing regimes by advancing principles upon
which the Framers could build their own conceptions.53
Other influential Enlightenment works included Montes-
46 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 67-69 (Raymond Kliban-
sky ed., J.W. Gough trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1968) (1689).
47 Id.  at 71.
48 HAMBURGER, supra  note 4, at 53.
49 Locke’s statements, while lacking in exactness, indicate his opposition to en-
forced taxation of religion.  He remarked that “[n]o man, therefore, with whatsoever
ecclesiastical office he may be dignified, can deprive any other man who is not of his
church or faith of life, liberty, or any part of his worldly goods on account of relig-
ion.” LOCKE, supra  note 46, at 87. R
50 See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra  note 44, at 72-78. R
51 HAMBURGER, supra  note 4, at 54 (quoting LOCKE, supra  note 46, at 85). R
52 LOCKE, supra  note 46, at 85. R
53 See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra  note 44, at 77-78 (asserting that for Locke and R
the Founders, a shift in understanding had occurred regarding the purpose of laws).
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quieu’s The Spirit of Laws ,54 which, among other matters, advo-
cated toleration of religious belief and freedom of worship,55 and
the writings of Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, who dis-
counted the divinity of the scriptures and a religious basis of the
law.56  The Founding generation, particularly a young Thomas
Jefferson, imbibed and recited Montesquieu and Bolingbroke.57
The works of the radical Whig philosophers like John Trenchard
and Thomas Gordon, the authors of Cato ’s Letters  (1723), were
also influential during the Founding era.58  Trenchard and
Gordon were strong advocates of freedom of expression and
government accountability and spoke out against corruption in
the government and the Anglican Church.59  Later opposition
writers who advocated for reforms in politics and the church in-
cluded John Cartwright, Richard Price, and Joseph Priestly.60
Priestly, who corresponded with many of the Founding genera-
tion before fleeing to America, called for the repeal of the Test
and Corporation Acts and the disestablishment of the Church of
England, insisting on an even greater separation of religious and
secular realms than had Locke.61  However, the “key book” of
the generation was Political Disquisitions , written by Whig
schoolteacher and theorist James Burgh.62  Like many radical
Whigs, Burgh spoke out against religious establishments, warning
of “a church’s getting too much power into her hands, and turn-
ing religion into a mere state engine.”63  In his book Crito , Burgh
called for building “an impenetrable wall of separation between
54 See BAILYN, supra  note 42, at 27-29; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF R
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 152-53 (1998).
55 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (J.V.
Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748).
56 ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:  ORIGINS, PHI-
LOSOPHY, AND THEOLOGY 19-40 (1998).
57 See BAILYN, supra  note 42, at 27-30; JAYNE, supra  note 56, at 19-40; WOOD, R
supra  note 54, at 150-53. R
58 BAILYN, supra  note 42, at 35-54 (examining the influence of several Whig writ- R
ers on the Founders); WOOD, supra  note 54, at 291-305. R
59 BAILYN, supra  note 42, at 35-36. R
60 Id.  at 41.
61 KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra  note 44, at 80-82. R
62 Id.  (quoting BAILYN, supra  note 42, at 41). See also CARLA H. HAY, JAMES R
BURGH, SPOKESMAN FOR REFORM IN HANOVERIAN ENGLAND 42-43 (1979); Oscar
Handlin & Mary Handlin, James Burgh and American Revolutionary Theory,  73
PROC. OF MASS. HIST. SOC’Y at 38-57 (1961) (examining Burgh’s influence on
American colonial thought and the Founders).
63 JAMES BURGH, 1 CRITO, OR, ESSAYS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 7 (1766–1767).
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things sacred and civil.”64  Burgh’s fans and subscribers included
not only Jefferson, but also George Washington, John Adams,
John Hancock, John Dickinson, Roger Sherman, and James Wil-
son, a “who’s who” of the Founding generation.65
All of these sources were widely read by the Founders and are
generally considered by historians to be ideologically central to
the Founding of the nation.66  They informed thought when revo-
lutionary leaders began the process of creating republican states
out of former British colonies.  To be sure, other ideological
strains influenced the Founding generation, including classical
antiquity, the common law, natural law, and even Protestant ev-
angelical and Puritan covenant thought.67  James Otis, among
others, urged a fundamental natural law, derived from God, to
serve as the source of natural and political rights.68  However,
Cornelia Le Boutillier has demonstrated that when the Founders
wrote about natural law, they usually gave it a utilitarian mean-
ing rather than a transcendental meaning.69  Even so, no one in
the Founding generation argued in favor of increasing
church–state ties and only a small number advocated retaining
the status quo of religious establishments.70  The point is that the
Founders imbibed multiple sources that promoted various con-
ceptions of religious toleration, freedom of conscience, disestab-
lishment, and church–state separation.  Because all sources
critiqued the status quo (or earlier church–state arrangements), it
64 2 id.  at 119.
65 HAY, supra  note 62, at 42. R
66 See BAILYN, supra  note 42, at 54 (“Within the framework of these ideas, En- R
lightenment abstractions and common law precedents, covenant theology and classi-
cal analogy—Locke and Abraham, Brutus and Coke—could all be brought together
into a comprehensive theory of politics.”).
67 See id.  at 22-54; WOOD, supra  note 54, at 1-124. R
68 See WOOD, supra  note 54, at 292-94. See also T. JEREMY GUNN, A STANDARD R
FOR REPAIR:  THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, EQUALITY, AND NATURAL RIGHTS 99-
103 (1992) (providing a background to the Revolution, beginning with the idea of
natural rights).
69 CORNELIA GEER LE BOUTILLIER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL
LAW 110 (1950) (“[T]he Founding Fathers, as they employed the notion of natural
law . . . gave it very often a utilitarian meaning.  Such a utilitarian meaning is logi-
cally in opposition to the transcendental meaning which relates to man’s rational
nature:  it supplies a contrary premise.”).
70 The leading exception was the orthodox Congregationalist Timothy Dwight,
who was later president of Yale College. See TIMOTHY DWIGHT, THE DUTY OF
AMERICANS, AT THE PRESENT CRISIS (New Haven, Conn., Thomas & Samuel Green
1798), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA
1730–1805, at 1365-94 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991).
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should not be surprising that none provided a completed version
of church–state separation (at least by modern conceptions).  In-
consistencies abounded.  What was important to the Founders
and what should be important to our modern efforts to under-
stand the period is that the ideas were dynamic and unfolding.
II
FOUNDING PERSPECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS
Revisionist historians such as Philip Hamburger and Daniel
Dreisbach have sought to discredit the Everson  rendition by ar-
guing that many of the Founders possessed multiple and often
conflicting understandings of church–state relationships.71  This
lack of a consensus (or of internal consistency in some of the
Founders) is seen as a weakness.  On the contrary, the historical
record of the period between 1775 and 1800 indicates a dynamic
development in thought about church–state relations and a
movement away from religious establishments and government
favoritism of religion to a regime of greater religious toleration
and liberty and of increasing disengagement between religious
and civil institutions.72
An initial caution must be made about any reliance on the his-
torical record.73  The historical record of any period—the Found-
ing period being no exception—is always incomplete.  We have
only those documents that have survived the eons and have been
transcribed and compiled.74  Direct legislative history about the
First Amendment Religion Clauses amounts to less than two
pages of House debate recorded in the Annals , involving only
eight Representatives out of ninety-one members of the First
Congress.75  There is no doubt that other important, unrecorded
discussions about the purpose and meaning of the Religion
Clauses took place during the House Committee on Style (which
71 See HAMBURGER, supra  note 4, at 1-9, 144-92; Daniel L. Dreisbach, A New
Perspective on Jefferson’s Views on Church–State Relations:  The Virginia Statute for
Establishing Religious Freedom in Its Legislative Context , 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 172
(1991).
72 See infra  text accompanying notes 96-177.
73 A similar discussion to the one in this text through the text accompanying infra
note 79 was originally published in Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establish-
ment Clause:  A Reassessment , 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 795-96 (2005).
74 See  James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution:  The Integrity of the
Documentary Record , 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1986).
75 The debate is recounted in GUNN, supra  note 68, at 41-67, and Green, supra R
note 73, at 780-94. R
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Madison chaired), in likely unrecorded House debates, in the un-
recorded Senate debate that accompanied the proposals re-
corded in the Senate Journal , and in the state ratifying debates.
This does not include the possible letters, pamphlets, and impor-
tant notations written on loose scraps of paper that are lost to
time.  In addition, the records that do exist may be woefully inac-
curate, as they were transcribed by people who made mistakes
and self-edited as they went along (not to mention allegations
that the transcriber for the Annals  was frequently inebriated).76
Madison stated that the accuracy of the reported debates of the
First Congress was “not to be relied on.”77
The face of the debates shews [sic] that they are defective,
and desultory, where not revised, or written out by the Speak-
ers.  In some instances, he makes them inconsistent with them-
selves, by erroneous reports of their speeches at different
times on the same subject.  [The reporter] was indolent and
sometimes filled up blanks in his notes from memory or
imagination .78
Historian John Murrin noted that “[t]he records of the [Constitu-
tional] Convention are corrupt, incomplete, or vague on many
issues, making them an extremely perilous arbiter.”79
Moreover, remarks contained within documents whose accu-
racy can be presumed can easily be misunderstood.  The Framers
used terms and phrases that were familiar in the late eighteenth
century and frequently employed rhetoric that was intentionally
vague, hyperbolic, or duplicitous.80  Their remarks also arose
within particular contexts that may not be apparent from the
documents themselves.  A prime example is Madison’s proposal
during the House debates to insert the word “national” before
“religion” in the proposed language:  “no religion shall be estab-
76 See  Hutson, supra  note 74, at 36-38 (discussing the excessive drinking of the R
reporter, Thomas Lloyd, and relating that his notes were “frequently ‘garbled’ and
that he neglected to report speeches whose texts are known to exist elsewhere”).
77 Id.  at 38 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Jan. 7,
1832)).
78 Id.
79 John M. Murrin, Fundamental Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitu-
tion , in TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION:  THE CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 1, 6 (Herman Belz et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter TO FORM A MORE PERFECT
UNION].
80 See  Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States , 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 413 (1986) (noting that “political rhetoric was as loose then as it is
now”).
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lished by law.”81  Some have argued that this proposal indicates
that Madison envisioned the Establishment Clause prohibition to
be quite narrow:  to prevent only the establishment of a national
church or religion as existed in Britain.82  Not only does this in-
terpretation conflict with Madison’s vision reflected in his other
works,83 but it takes the event out of context.  Madison was re-
sponding to concerns of Benjamin Huntington of New Hamp-
shire that the proposed language could be used to inhibit the
existing establishments in the New England states.84  Madison of-
fered his proposal to clarify that the proposed First Amendment,
like the rest of the Bill of Rights, applied to powers of the na-
tional government only, and did not suggest that the establish-
ment of a “national religion” represented the overriding concern
of the Framers.85  The point is that the context in which a writing
was created may be as important as its words.
We should also be cautious about drawing meaning from the
Founders’ use of religious language.  Historians have long docu-
mented the ubiquity of religious rhetoric and imagery in early
discourse, which is hardly surprising considering the earlier influ-
ence of religion on education and intellectual thought.86  Unfor-
tunately, this provides opportunity for pseudo-histories (and
pseudo-historians) to use the Founders’ religious statements to
proof-text conservative religious interpretations of the Founding
period.87  However, the more common and habitual religious
rhetoric was during the Founding period, the less significance we
81 See  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758-59 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
82 See, e.g. , Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
CORD, supra  note 13, at 7. R
83 See generally JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Robert S. Alley ed.,
1985) (discussing documents and commentary that demonstrate Madison’s expan-
sive view of church–state separation); Donald L. Drakeman, Religion and the Re-
public:  James Madison and the First Amendment , 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 427 (1983)
(same).
84 See  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758.
85 See id.  at 758-59.
86 See generally GAUSTAD, supra  note 11; JAMES H. HUTSON, THE FOUNDERS ON R
RELIGION:  A BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (2005); James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of
Liberalism:  Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Dis-
course , 74 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1987); Harry S. Stout, Religion, Communications, and the
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution , 34 WM. & MARY Q. 519 (1977).
87 See, e.g. , DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION:  WHAT IS THE CORRECT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE? (3d ed. 1992); JOHN EIDSMOE,
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION:  THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS
(1987); GOD OF OUR FATHERS (Josiah Benjamin Richards ed., 1994); TIM LAHAYE,
FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS (1987).
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can attach to any particular statements; neither should we draw
any conclusions from the aggregate use of religious language
other than that it reflected contemporary eighteenth century
practices.88  Religious language was one of several familiar idi-
oms of public discourse available to the Founding generation.89
The religious statements of George Washington are a favorite
proof-texting source for the Supreme Court’s conservatives
(among others);90 however, as Paul Boller and Edwin Gaustad
have demonstrated, while Washington liberally used religious
language, he was a rationalist deist whose support for disestab-
lishment and religious equality grew through his political ca-
reer.91  While his rhetoric may sound extremely religious to our
postmodern ears, Washington’s careful use of nonsectarian, alle-
gorical language common to religious rationalists indicates in-
stead a break from the earlier Puritan and evangelical cultures.92
Thus, the precise meanings of the Founders’ religious statements
may be ambiguous at best.93
Finally, persuasive evidence exists that the Framers believed
that constitutional interpretation should be drawn from the ex-
press language of the document, not from the statements of those
who drafted the language, and particularly not from later state-
ments unconnected to the drafting of the documents themselves.
According to H. Jefferson Powell, “[t]he framers shared the
traditional common law view—so foreign to much hermeneutical
thought in more recent years—that the import of the document
they were framing would be determined by reference to the in-
88 See generally JAMES H. HUTSON, FORGOTTEN FEATURES OF THE FOUNDING:
THE RECOVERY OF RELIGIOUS THEMES IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2003)
(documenting the ubiquity of religious rhetoric in early discourse); FRANK LAM-
BERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (2003)
(same).
89 See  Isaac Kramnick, The Discourse of Politics in 1787:  The Constitution and Its
Critics on Individualism, Community, and the State , in TO FORM A MORE PERFECT
UNION, supra  note 79, at 166, 167-68. R
90 See, e.g. , Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005).
91 See GAUSTAD, supra  note 11, at 76-77; Paul F. Boller, Jr., George Washington R
and Religious Liberty , 17 WM. & MARY Q. 486, 489 (1960).
92 See GAUSTAD, supra  note 11, at 76-77; Boller, supra  note 91, at 489. R
93 See  Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can read-
ily be found to support either side of the proposition.  The ambiguity of history is
understandable if we recall the nature of the problems uppermost in the thinking of
the statesmen who fashioned the religious guarantees; they were concerned with far
more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm of religion than any that our
century has witnessed.”).
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trinsic meaning of its words or through the usual judicial process
of case-by-case interpretation.”94  Elbridge Gerry is reported to
have said that “all construction of the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, is dangerous or unnatural, and therefore ought to be
avoided.”95  Thus, Justice Brennan once remarked, “[a] too lit-
eral quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues
of these cases seems . . . futile and misdirected.”96
With this caution in mind, several factors suggest that the
Founding period was one of dynamic development in attitudes
toward church–state relationships.  First, the American Revolu-
tion came at the end of a period of religious experimentalism and
expansion commonly called the First Great Awakening.  Al-
though known for its emotional revivals that challenged the staid
religious practices of the established churches, the Great Awak-
ening’s greatest significance was breaking down forces of relig-
ious uniformity and substituting notions of religious equality and
voluntaryism.97  Historians have documented how democratic
ideas flowed into the religious movement (and out again), under-
mining assumptions about the necessity of state supported relig-
ion.98  In turn, as the Revolution approached, a “strange
coalition of rationalists and pietistic-revivalistic sectarians . . .
provided much of the propelling energy behind the final thrust
for the religious freedom that was written into the constitution of
the new nation.”99  What the Great Awakening cemented, how-
ever, was the notion that participation in and support of religious
worship should be voluntary, not compelled by the state.
With the advent of the Revolution, approximately half of the
new states (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Rhode Island, and North Carolina) abolished any remnants of
religious establishments with forced assessments.100  Granted,
church establishments had never worked well, or at all, in any of
these former colonies, so disestablishment was not difficult to
94 See  H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent , 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 903-04 (1985).
95 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 574 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
96 Schempp , 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97 See JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH:  CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 164-224 (1990); SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT:  THE SHAPING
OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 16-43 (1963).
98 See generally NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN
CHRISTIANITY 6-11 (1989).
99 MEAD, supra  note 97, at 35. R
100 See LEVY, supra  note 11, at 25-62. R
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achieve.101  However, the point is that none of these new states
considered moving in the opposite direction toward increasing
church–state ties, even though they were arguably free to do
so.102  And granted, most of these disestablished states retained
other practices far removed from a modern regime of separation,
such as religious requirements for public officeholding and par-
ticipating in legal proceedings, (i.e., oath requirements), official
acknowledgments of religion and a host of religiously based
sumptuary laws (e.g., blasphemy and Sabbath laws).103  These
states, however, had taken the first steps toward separationism
and several shortly began to abolish other religious disqualifica-
tions they had retained from the colonial era.  For example, in
1786, Pennsylvania liberalized its religious requirements for pub-
lic officeholding and its constitution of 1790 omitted earlier refer-
ences to “Almighty God” as the source for republican
government.104  They were not going backward.
The remaining eight states retained or reauthorized their ex-
isting structures of religious assessments and legal preferences
for Christianity.  By the end of the Revolution, however, even
the more formal Anglican establishments in Virginia and South
Carolina had given way to what are now called “multiple estab-
lishments,” which provided that a taxpayer could have his assess-
ment paid to his own church or, as was more common in New
101 Id.
102 See, e.g. , J. WILLIAM FROST, A PERFECT FREEDOM:  RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
PENNSYLVANIA 60-78 (1990) (noting that after a restrictive trend during the Revolu-
tionary War with the enforcement of religious behavioral laws, Pennsylvania
adopted a constitution in 1790 that was quite “radical” on issues of disestablishment
and toleration).
103 William Penn, Essay II , INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Jan 2-3, 1788, reprinted in
3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST § 3.12.18, at 174-75 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981).  For example, Penn observed:
[W]e find it declared in every one of our [state] bills of rights, “that there
shall be a perfect liberty of conscience, and that no sect shall ever be enti-
tled to a preference over the others.”  Yet in Massachusetts and Maryland,
all the officers of government, and in Pennsylvania the members of the
legislature, are to be of the Christian religion; in New-Jersey, North-Caro-
lina, and Georgia, the protestant, and in Delaware, the trinitarian sects,
have an exclusive right to public employments; and in South-Carolina the
constitution goes so far as to declare the creed of the established church.
Virginia and New-York are the only states where there is a perfect liberty
of conscience.
Id.  (footnote omitted). See also FROST, supra  note 102, at 71-72. R
104 See FROST, supra note 102, at 74-77; Letter from Benjamin Rush to Richard
Price (Apr. 22, 1786), reprinted in  4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 57 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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England, to that church chosen by the majority vote of the par-
ish.105  However, this description does not reveal the ongoing dy-
namism in those states.  In 1786, Virginia rejected a bill that
would have allowed tax assessments for religious worship, adopt-
ing in its stead Jefferson’s “Act for Establishing Religious Free-
dom” that had lain dormant since 1779.106  In addition, by 1789,
four other states had moved away from maintaining religious es-
tablishments in the sense understood as tax support for religious
worship.107  The first Georgia and Maryland constitutions al-
lowed for religious assessments, but neither state ever instituted
a system.108  Maryland voters rejected a proposed assessment in
1785, indicating a quick reversal of opinion, while a Georgia law
of the same year apparently never went into effect.109  New con-
stitutions in Georgia in 1789 and 1798, respectively, removed the
religious test for officeholding and abolished all authority for as-
sessments.110  Although the 1778 South Carolina Constitution de-
clared a “general establishment” of Protestantism, limiting
church incorporation and public officeholding to Protestants, it
inconsistently provided that no person could be compelled to
support any religious body.111  Thus, South Carolina’s “establish-
ment” amounted only to “a method of incorporating churches,
and no church received public tax support.”112  South Carolina’s
constitution of 1790 omitted the remaining reference to an estab-
lishment and removed earlier religious restrictions on public of-
ficeholding.113  Finally, in 1786, Vermont rewrote its constitution
105 See LEVY, supra  note 11, at 26; 2 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND R
DISSENT, 1630–1833, passim  (1971).
106 See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIR-
GINIA, 1776–1787, at 144-72 (1977); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 135-
48 (1986); Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom
(1785), reprinted in  5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 84.
107 See CURRY, supra  note 106, at 152-58; LEVY, supra  note 11, at 47-49. R
108 See CURRY, supra  note 106, at 152-58. R
109 Id.  at 153-56.
110 Id.  at 153 (citing 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLO-
NIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, H.R. DOC.
No. 357, at 779, 784, 789, 800-01 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1906) [hereinafter
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]).
111 Id.  at 150 (citing 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra  note 110, at R
3251-53, 3255-56).
112 Id.
113 Id.  at 151 (citing 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra  note 110, at R
3664).
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of 1777, reaffirming that “no man ought, or of right can be com-
pelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any
place of worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the dic-
tates of his conscience,” but removing the previous contradictory
provision requiring “support” of public worship.114  All of these
developments reveal a progression of thought about the meaning
of church–state separation and freedom of conscience at the state
level.
To be sure, active religious establishments continued into the
nineteenth century in three states:  Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire.115  However, even in those states, the idea
of a religious establishment was not particularly popular, and op-
position to tax assessments and religious preferences was strong
and growing.116  Increasingly, early Americans believed that en-
forced tax support of one religion generally violated rights of
conscience.117  As Thomas Curry has written, by the time of the
ratification of the Constitution, “[t]he belief that government as-
sistance to religion, especially in the form of taxes, violated relig-
ious liberty had a long history.”118
As a result of pressure from within and without, officials in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire were increas-
ingly reticent to admit to having a religious establishment due to
the negative connotation the term carried with its association
with hated European establishments.119  John Adams referred to
114 Id.  at 188-89 (citing 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra  note 110, R
at 3740, 3743, 3752).  Despite this change to Article III, in 1787 Vermont enacted a
law authorizing churches to levy and collect contributions of support from their
members, a law that existed until 1807.  2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra  note 105, at 801-12. R
115 See LEVY, supra  note 11, at 26-44. R
116 See CURRY, supra  note 106, at 162-92. R
117 See, e.g. , VT. CONST. of 1786, chap. I, art. 3, reprinted in  5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 85 (stating “that no man ought, or of right can be
compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship,
or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of his conscience”); JAMES
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS pa-
ras. 3-4 (1785), reprinted in  5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 82
(arguing that enforced assessments violate rights of conscience). See also  Douglas
Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion:  A False Claim About Original Intent ,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 917 (1986).
118 CURRY, supra  note 106, at 217. Accord  Laycock, supra  note 117, at 917 R
(“[T]ax support for churches was deeply controversial and widely thought inconsis-
tent with religious liberty.”).
119 Laycock, supra  note 117, at 906.  As Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith of New R
Hampshire declared in an 1803 decision:
[A] religious establishment . . . is where the State prescribes a formulary of
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the Massachusetts arrangement as “a very slender one, hardly to
be called an establishment.”120  However, Adams, like most as-
sessment supporters at the time, would not have viewed the sys-
tem as violating rights of conscience because no one, at least in
theory, was forced to pay for another’s religion.121  Connecticut
jurist Zephaniah Swift wrote in the 1790s that
[e]very christian may believe, worship, and support in such
manner as he thinks right, and if he does not feel disposed to
join public worship, he may stay at home and believe as he
pleases, without any inconvenience, but the payment of his tax
to support public worship in the located society where he
lives.122
Swift denied that Connecticut maintained a religious establish-
ment, which he associated with systems that favored one church
exclusively.123
By the final decade of the eighteenth century, however, the
New England argument that nonpreferential multiple establish-
ments did not violate rights of conscience was losing ground to
the more compelling arguments found in Jefferson’s Act for Es-
tablishing Religious Freedom124 and Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance .125  Increasingly, people shared Jefferson’s view
that forcing a man even “to support this or that teacher of his
faith and worship for the rule and government of all the subjects.  Here the
State do [sic] neither.  It is left to each town and parish, not to prescribe
rules of faith or doctrine for the members of the corporation, but barely to
elect a teacher of religion and morality for the society, who is to be main-
tained at the expense of the whole.  The privilege is extended to all denom-
inations.  There is no one in this respect superior or inferior to another.
Muzzy v. Wilkins, 1 Smith 1, 9 (N.H. 1803) (internal citations omitted).
120 See ISAAC BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 1774–75, reprinted in  5
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 65.
121 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote in upholding a challenge to
the state’s religious assessment system that
the first objection seems to mistake a man’s conscience for his money, and
to deny the state a right of levying and of appropriating the money of the
citizens, at the will of the legislature, in which they all are represented. . . .
The great error lies in not distinguishing between liberty of conscience in
religious opinions and worship, and the right of appropriating money by
the state.  The former is an unalienable right; the latter is surrendered to
the state, as the price of protection.
Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 401, 408-09 (1810).
122 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, 1 A SYSTEM OF LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 146
(Arno Press 1972) (1795).
123 CURRY, supra note 106, at 184.
124 Jefferson, supra note 106, at 84-85.
125 See MADISON, supra  note 117, at 82-85. R
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own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable lib-
erty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose
morals he would make his pattern.”126  Madison’s case for why
multiple establishments violated rights of conscience convinced
Virginia, in 1786, to join the ranks of the disestablished states of
North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Rhode Island, and served as an example to disestablishment
forces in Maryland, Georgia, and South Carolina.127  By the time
of the drafting of the First Amendment, therefore, compelled as-
sessments for the support of religion existed in only three New
England states and were unevenly enforced.128  Douglas Laycock
has written that “[b]y the time of the first amendment, church
taxes were repealed or moribund outside New England, and they
were not working well in the [three] New England states that still
tried to collect them.”129  This movement away from religious as-
sessments and the expanding notion of rights of conscience thus
demonstrate the dynamic nature of the Founding period.
Derek Davis, in his important study of religion and the Conti-
nental and Confederation Congresses, documents a similar pro-
gression in attitudes toward religious liberty and church–state
separation at the early national level.130  Davis indicates that the
Continental Congress adopted several religious practices also en-
gaged in by the colonial and early state legislatures (chaplaincies,
legislative prayers, and Thanksgiving and fast day observ-
ances),131 endorsed the printing of the Bible,132 and considered
making purchases of the Bible during the Revolutionary War.133
These practices were not new, however, and were often adopted
without much debate or thought.134  In contrast, in 1776 Con-
126 Jefferson, supra  note 106, at 84.
127 See CURRY, supra note 106, at 146-48.
128 See LEVY, supra  note 11, at 25-62. See also 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra  note 105, R
at 962-70 (discussing the difficulty in administering the assessment in Connecticut).
According to McLoughlin, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1783 and subsequent
law authorizing assessments “did not require  towns to levy taxes for the support of
religion; [they] simply said they might do so ‘agreeably to the Constitution.’” Id.  at
850.
129 Laycock, supra  note 117, at 917. R
130 DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORIGINAL INTENT (2002).
131 See id.  at 73-90 (discussing the historical context of legislative and military
chaplaincies).
132 See id.  at 144-48.
133 Id.  at 195.
134 Id.  at 91.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 24  7-MAR-07 11:17
466 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 443
gress considered a proposal by John Dickinson that would have
prohibited states from disadvantaging anyone on account of his
religion or compelling the attendance at or support of “any relig-
ious Worship, Place of Worship, or Ministry, contrary to his or
her Mind,” effectively abolishing religious assessments nation-
wide.135  Congress rejected the proposal as infringing on the
rights of the states, but likely it went further toward separation
than many were willing to go at the time.136  However, such ideas
were percolating.  Also, the Confederation Congress broke with
the then-prevailing state practice of religious tests for officehold-
ing, “a sure sign that the meaning of religious liberty in America
was progressive and tended increasingly to ‘separate’ church and
state.”137  And in one of its final acts, the Congress refused to
provide land grants for churches and houses of worship when it
approved the land ordinance for the Northwest Territory in
1787.138
Davis acknowledges that when one considers the entirety of
Congress’ religious activity, it “operated almost exclusively
within an accommodationist paradigm.”139  Davis asserts, how-
ever, that this fact “recedes in significance . . . when it is recog-
nized that the separationist paradigm was at that time only
beginning to be recognized for its advantages to national life.”140
He concludes that “[a]ll of the evidence, then, when examined in
historical context, supports separationism as that paradigm of
church–state thought that best captures the progressively evolv-
ing intentions of the Founding fathers.”141
The closest that Americans have come to having a national dis-
cussion about the meaning of religious liberty and church–state
separation occurred during the ratification of the Constitution.
That discussion centered on two interrelated issues:  (1) calls for
an amendment to the Constitution to protect religious liberty,
and (2) the debate over the Article VI, clause 3 prohibition
against religious tests for national officeholding.  Like the more
formal legislative actions addressed above, this discussion dem-
135 See id.  at 158-61; WITTE, supra note 36, at 74-75.
136 See DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 161; WITTE, supra  note 36, at 75. R
137 DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 202. R
138 See  Ronald A. Smith, Freedom of Religion and the Land Ordinance of 1785 , 24
J. CHURCH & ST. 589, 589 & n.1 (1982).
139 DAVIS, supra note 130, at 227.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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onstrates an evolution in attitudes toward the idea of separation
of church and state.
The proposed Constitution met with immediate opposition
from so-called anti-federalists who feared the new frame of gov-
erning would shift power from the states to the national level,
infringing on individual liberties and states’ rights.  Anti-federal-
ists pointed to the absence of a bill of rights limiting national
power as a cardinal defect of the proposed constitution.142  While
some raised the issue merely to defeat ratification, others pushed
for a series of amendments as a condition for ratification.143  Al-
though federalists like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
initially opposed a bill of rights on the ground that one would
imply the existence of powers the national government did not
possess, they shortly acceded to the arguments for amendments
to the Constitution upon ratification.144
Among the numerous calls for amendments were calls for pro-
visions to protect religious rights.  The debate over amendments
gave people throughout the nation the opportunity to rethink
ideas about religious liberty and church–state separation.
Through numerous petitions, pamphlets, and letters to newspa-
pers, Americans expressed sentiments that indicate an awareness
of past religious liberty.145  These writings also indicate that peo-
142 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITU-
TION 137-73 (1988) (discussing the political dynamic surrounding the calls for a bill
of rights).
143 See id.
144 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). Compare  James
Madison, Statement at Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), reprinted in  5
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 88 (expressing doubt that “a bill
of rights [provides] security for religion”), with  Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in  1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:  THE CORRE-
SPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776–1786, at
562, 564 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (“My own opinion has always been in favor
of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be
included in the enumeration.  At the same time I have never thought the omission a
material defect . . . .”).
145 See, e.g. , A Farmer, Essay VII , MD. GAZETTE (Balt.), Apr. 11, 1788, reprinted
in  5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, § 5.1.107, at 63.  Expressing R
a concern for religious tyranny based on history, “A Farmer” stated:
Civil and religious liberty are inseparably interwoven—whilst government
is pure and equal—religion will be uncontaminated:—The moment govern-
ment becomes disordered, bigotry and fanaticism take root and grown—
they are soon converted to serve the purpose of usurpation, and finally,
religious persecution reciprocally supports and is supported by the tyranny
of the temporal powers.
Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 26  7-MAR-07 11:17
468 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 443
ple believed that religious freedoms were still unfolding and that
they were unwilling to be satisfied with what had been achieved
to date.146  And, significantly, the writings reveal an understand-
ing of the temporal quality of their situation:  that they could not
presume future conditions and could only try to equip the nation
to deal with future threats to liberty.147  The Pennsylvania writer
“An Old Whig” wrote in 1788:
The fact is, that human nature is still the same that ever it was:
the fashion indeed changes; but the seeds of superstition, big-
otry and enthusiasm, are too deeply implanted in our minds,
ever to be eradicated . . . . They are idiots who trust their fu-
ture security to the whim of the present hour . . . .
The more I reflect upon the history of mankind, the more I
am disposed to think that it is our duty to secure the essential
rights of the people, by every precaution; for not an avenue
has been left unguarded, through which oppression could pos-
sibly enter in any government . . . . We ought therefore in a bill
of rights  to secure, in the first place, by the most express stipu-
lations, the sacred rights of conscience.148
Others called for greater limitations on religious influences in
government:
Religion, is certainly attended with dangerous consequences
to government:  it hath been the cause of millions being
slaughtered . . . but in a peculiar manner the christian religion
. . . is of all others the most unfavourable to a government
founded upon nature; because it pretends to be of a supernat-
ural divine origin, and therefore sets itself above nature.149
146 For an example, see William Penn quoted at supra  note 103, in which he ex- R
pressed dissatisfaction with the retention of religious tests under a majority of early
state constitutions.
147 See  William Lancaster, Statement at North Carolina Ratifying Convention
(July 30, 1788), in  4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 212, 215 (William S. Hein & Co. 1996)
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (“[L]et us remember that we form a government
for millions not yet in existence.”).
148 An Old Whig, Essay V , INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 1787–Feb. 1788, re-
printed in  3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, §§ 3.3.27-28, at 35- R
36. Accord  Centinel, Essay II, FREEMAN’S J. (Phila.), Nov. 7, 1787, reprinted in  2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, § 2.7.55, at 152 (“[B]ut there is R
no declaration, that all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Al-
mighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding;
and that no man ought, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship,
or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or
against his own free will consent; and that no authority can or ought to be vested in,
or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any
manner controul [sic], the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious wor-
ship . . . .”).
149 ARISTOCROTIS, THE GOVERNMENT OF NATURE DELINEATED, OR AN EXACT
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And, as anti-federalist Thomas Tredwell stated in the New
York ratification convention:  “I could have wished also that suf-
ficient caution had been used to secure to us our religious liber-
ties, and to have prevented the general government from
tyrannizing over our consciences by a religious establishment.”150
Generally, the letters and pamphlets that circulated from 1787
through 1789 expressed concerns about preserving rights of con-
science and preventing government preference of particular
sects, a condition that many felt still existed in several of the
states.151  The petitioners desired greater  security for religious
freedoms, to be achieved in part through greater separation of
the religious and governmental realms.  The perfect arrangement
had yet to be realized.152  At the same time, a smaller number of
writers, commenting chiefly during the debate over prohibiting
religious tests, spoke about the necessity of religion for the pres-
ervation of government:  “[W]ithout the prevalence of Christian
piety, and morals , the best republican Constitution can never
save us from slavery and ruin.”153  That some people disagreed
with the need for greater separation and were forced to defend
the status quo confirms that their views were under attack and
that a dynamic transformation was underway.
In the end, a handful of state ratifying conventions recom-
mended proposed amendments to the Federal Constitution to
protect religious rights.154  Every proposal sought to enhance  the
cause of religious liberty; the primary goals were to protect free-
PICTURE OF THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1788), reprinted in 3 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, § 3.16.14, at 206. R
150 Thomas Tredwell, Statement at New York Ratifying Convention (July 1, 1788),
in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra  note 147, at 396, 399. R
151 See, e.g. , Penn, supra  note 103, §§ 3.12.11-19, at 171-75. R
152 See  Oliver Wolcott, Statement at Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 9,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra  note 147, at 201, 202 (“Knowledge and liberty R
are so prevalent in this country, that I do not believe that the United States would
ever be disposed to establish one religious sect, and lay all others under legal disabil-
ities.  But as we know not what may take place hereafter . . . I cannot think it alto-
gether superfluous to . . . secure[ ] us from the possibility of such oppression.”).
153 Charles Turner, Statement at Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Feb. 5,
1788), in  4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, § 4.18.2, at 219, 221. R
See also  David, Letter in Response to Elihu, MASS. GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1788, re-
printed in  4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, § 4.24.3, at 247; A R
Proposal for Reviving Christian Conviction , VA. INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 31, 1787, re-
printed in  5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, § 5.8.2, at 126. R
154 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 11-13 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).  Minor-
ity blocks in three additional state conventions (Maryland, Massachusetts, and Penn-
sylvania) also urged religious freedom amendments. Id.  at 11-12.
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dom of conscience and guarantee sect equality.155  The anti-fed-
eralist minority in Maryland proposed “[t]hat there be no
national religion established by law, but that all persons be
equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty.”156  How-
ever, the majority of the religious proposals came from states
that had already abolished religious establishments and guaran-
teed religious conscience in their constitutions (e.g., Virginia,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and New York), indicating a de-
sire to advance those principles at the national level.  For exam-
ple, the Virginia convention proposed a federal amendment
affirming an “unalienable right to the free exercise of religion
according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular re-
ligious sect or society ought to be favored or established by Law
in preference to others.”157  North Carolina, also lacking a relig-
ious establishment, proposed an amendment that tracked the
language of Virginia’s.158
Of the states with active establishments, only the proposal
from the New Hampshire convention can arguably be inter-
preted as expressing a desire to protect existing religious estab-
lishments from the federal government (“Congress shall make no
Laws touching Religion, or to infringe the rights of Con-
science”).159  However, there is no legislative history of the New
Hampshire proposal to explain whether its language expressed
only a national concern or a federalism one, too.160  In contrast,
Pennsylvania, which was undergoing a liberalization in
church–state arrangements, wanted to continue with its trend
unencumbered by the national government, proposing that “the
United States shall [not] have authority to alter, abrogate, or in-
fringe any part of the constitutions of the several states, which
provide for the preservation of liberty in matters of religion.”161
An additional example of the dynamic nature of the period is
155 See id.
156 See id.  at 11.  According to Leonard Levy, the proposal failed, not because the
federalist majority disagreed with its substance, but because they “wished to ratify
unconditionally for the purpose of demonstrating confidence in the new system of
government.” LEVY, supra  note 11, at 69. R
157 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra  note 154, at 13. R
158 See id.  at 12.
159 Id.  The issue over whether the drafters of the Establishment Clause viewed its
purpose in using federalism terms as protecting existing religious establishments is
considered in Green, supra  note 73, at 763.
160 See LEVY, supra  note 11, at 70. R
161 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra  note 154, at 12. R
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found in the ratification controversy over the Article VI, clause 3
prohibition against religious tests for national officeholding.  A
majority of states, including those that had abolished religious
assessments, initially retained requirements for a belief in the
“Christian God” or the ability to take an oath premised on the
belief in accountability for sins after death.162  The drafters of the
Constitution broke with that tradition, however, adopting with-
out dissent a proposal by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina to
bar “religious test[s] . . . as a qualification” for federal officehold-
ing.163  The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were not
charting new ground, however, as religious test laws had increas-
ingly been criticized as instruments of religious persecution and
civil disqualification.164
During the state ratification debates, anti-federalists seized on
the document’s prohibition of religious tests, with several alleg-
ing that it encouraged atheism in the new country.165  Critics
claimed the no-religious-test clause was “dangerous and impoli-
tic,”166 with one New Hampshire writer maintaining that “ac-
cording to this [provision] we may have a Papist, a Mohomatan, a
Deist, yea an Atheist at the helm of Government.”167  Relating a
concern shared by many, Luther Martin told the Maryland As-
sembly that “in a Christian country, it would be at least decent to
hold out some distinction between the professors of Christianity
162 See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 37 (rev. ed. 1964).
163 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 468 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937).  Roger Sherman of Connecticut voiced hesitation, but concluded
that “the prevailing liberality [was] a sufficient security [against] such tests.” Id.
164 See  Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Richard Price (Oct. 9, 1780), reprinted
in  4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 634; Letters from Benjamin
Rush to Richard Price (Oct. 15, 1785 & Apr. 22, 1786), reprinted in  4 THE FOUN-
DERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 636; Penn, supra  note 103, §§ 3.12.11-19, at R
171-75; Noah Webster, On Test Laws, Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, and Par-
tial Exclusions from Office , Mar. 1787, reprinted in  4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITU-
TION, supra  note 104, at 636.
165 See What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-
IST, supra  note 103, at 1, 22-23; Turner, supra  note 153, at 221. R
166 Henry Abbot & James Iredell,  Debate the Ban on Religious Tests:  Could Not
the Pope Be President? (July 30, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION:
FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING
THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 902, 902 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (statement
of Henry Abbot) [hereinafter THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION].
167 A Friend to the Rights of the People, Anti-Federalist, No. I , FREEMAN’S ORA-
CLE (N.H.), Feb. 8, 1788, reprinted in  4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 103, § 4.23.3, at 242. R
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and downright infidelity or paganism.”168
Although the potential impact of the no-religious-test clause
troubled many anti-federalists, the provision indicated more gen-
erally that the Constitution and the new government relied on
secular–rationalist principles rather than on religious sentiments.
During the ratification debates, anti-federalists decried what they
perceived as a deliberate attempt by the Constitution’s support-
ers to disassociate the new government from a religious founda-
tion:  “[A]ll religion is expressly rejected from the Constitution.
Was there ever any State or kingdom, that could subsist, without
adopting some system of religion?”169  Connecticut delegate Wil-
liam Williams also expressed concern over the absence of “an
explicit acknowledgement of the being of a God, his perfections
and his providence” in the Constitution.170  In order to remedy
the error, Williams proposed alternative language to be inserted
in the Preamble acknowledging “the one living and true God, the
creator and supreme Governour of the world . . . his universal
providence and the authority of his laws.”171  Williams, who oth-
erwise supported ratification, acknowledged his suggested word-
ing had no chance of being approved.172  Still, Williams’s
proposal typified the frustration of a small but vocal group who
found fault with the Constitution’s secular character.
What is significant about the debate over the no-religious-test
clause is that its Federalist defenders came to view the purpose of
the clause as not merely diffusing religious controversy at the na-
tional level, but as inexorably linked to advancing religious lib-
erty and church–state separation.  James Iredell of North
Carolina tied religious test requirements directly to despised re-
ligious establishments.173  The proposed prohibition at the na-
168 Luther Martin’s Letter on the Federal Convention of 1787 (Jan. 27, 1788), in  1
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra  note 147, at 344, 386. R
169 Samuel, Letter to the Editor, INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, Jan.
10, 1788, reprinted in  4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 103, R
§ 4.14.7, at 195. See also A Proposal for Reviving Christian Conviction , supra  note
153, § 5.8.2, at 126 (“[T]he most approved and wisest legislators in all ages, in order R
to give efficacy to their civil institutions, have found it necessary to call in the aid of
religion; and in no form of government whatever has the influence of religious prin-
ciples been found so requisite as in that of a republic.”).
170 William Williams, To Obtain Blessings from the Most High , AM. MERCURY
(Hartford, Conn.), Feb. 11, 1788, reprinted in  2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra  note 166, at 193. R
171 Id.
172 Id.  at 194.
173 See  Abbot & Iredell, supra  note 166, at 903. R
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tional level, Iredell insisted, was “one of the strongest proofs . . .
that it was the intention of those who formed this system, to es-
tablish a general religious liberty in America.”174  Zachariah
Johnston of Virginia echoed the belief that “the exclusion of
tests, will strongly tend to establish religious freedom.”175
Equally significant was the fact that Federalist defenders of the
no-religious-test clause did not recoil from the anti-federalist
charge about the irreligious character of the Constitution.  Oliver
Ellsworth, writing as “A Landholder” in the Connecticut Cou-
rant , defended the no-religious-test clause as the only means of
avoiding religious tyranny and preventing discord among the nu-
merous religious sects throughout the nation.176  It was the anti-
federalists’ criticism that the Constitution lacked a religious foun-
dation, however, that presented “the true principle, by which this
question ought to be determined.”177  Emphasizing the civil  na-
ture of the government in his reply, Ellsworth asserted that “[t]he
business of civil government is to protect the citizen in his rights,
to defend the community from hostile powers, and to promote
the general welfare.”178  Civil government had no jurisdiction
over religious matters and “no business to meddle with the pri-
vate opinions of the people.”179  In the end, the Federalists pre-
vailed and the no-religious-test clause became the model for the
gradual abolition of similar requirements at the state level.180
*  *  *  *
The purpose of this Section has not been to argue that all of
the Founders, or even a majority of them, were dyed-in-the-wool
separationists.  To be sure, Jefferson and Madison were excep-
tional for their views on church–state relationships.  Rather, the
point is that the last quarter of the eighteenth century was one of
dramatic change in the legal arrangements and popular attitudes
174 Id.
175 Zachariah Johnston, Statement at Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 25,
1788), in  2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra  note 166, at 751, 752. See R
also  Edmond Randolph, Statement at Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10,
1788), in  3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra  note 147, at 194, 204-05. R
176 A Landholder, or Oliver Ellsworth, No Religious Test Shall Ever Be Required ,
CONN. COURANT, Dec. 17, 1787, reprinted in  1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra  note 166, at 523-24. R
177 Id.  at 524.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra  note 162, at 245-48 (examining the no-religious- R
test debate in Maryland).
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toward church–state relationships.  Religious liberty was an un-
folding idea and notions of religious equality rights of conscience,
and church–state separation were dynamic and developing.
Nothing in relation to this issue was static.  As a result, no writing
or practice could represent or encapsulate “the” popular under-
standing of church–state separation.
III
THE AMBIGUITY OF CONTEMPORARY PRACTICES
The above discussion suggests that late eighteenth century
statements and practices concerning religion are unreliable as
guides for resolving modern church–state controversies.  Because
the Founders viewed church–state separation as an unfolding
idea, not an accomplished reality, no document or practice can
accurately represent contemporary perspectives about the issue.
Nonetheless, commentators, judges, and lawyers continue to
mine the historical record for supporting evidence from the past,
usually to show that the Founders did not intend to adopt a re-
gime of church–state separation purportedly represented in Ev-
erson v. Board of Education .  Three events have commonly been
viewed as significant and frequently referenced:  the appointment
of chaplains by the First Congress, the practice of Thanksgiving
Day proclamations, and the adoption of the Northwest Land Or-
dinance of 1787.181
The practice of legislative prayer and worship services had a
long history in America by the time Congress appointed the first
congressional chaplains in 1789.  New England had a tradition of
election and fast sermons and legislative prayer dating back to
the seventeenth century, and over time, the practices moved to
other colonies.182  The pending crisis with Great Britain and the
need of Americans to identify their cause with God and his prov-
idence led the First Continental Congress to adopt the practice of
opening its sessions with prayer,183 soon to be followed by the
appointment of two paid congressional chaplains, an Anglican
priest and a Presbyterian minister, who served from 1776 to
181 See, e.g. , Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99-103 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-78 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 787-88 (1983).
182 See generally POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA
1730–1805, supra note 70.
183 WITTE, supra  note 36, at 72. See, e.g. , 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 26 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 1904); 2 id.  at 12.
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1784.184  The chaplains offered prayers, scripture readings, and
an occasional sermon—all supportive of the patriot cause—and
delegates would periodically attend local worship services en
masse.185  At the beginning of the war with Britain, the Conti-
nental Congress also established military chaplains for the Conti-
nental Army, a corps that has continued until this day.186  Finally,
as the war ensued, the Continental Congress periodically issued
proclamations calling for public prayer, fasting, and piety, includ-
ing the first Thanksgiving proclamation on November 1, 1777.187
Based on this precedent, the First Congress voted in April of
1789 that each house would appoint its own chaplain to open
each legislative session with a prayer.188  Congress enacted a stat-
ute providing for the payment of the chaplains on September 25,
1789, the vote coming within a week of the final approval of the
language of the Bill of Rights.189  Several days after the language
of the Bill of Rights was approved, Congress passed a resolution
asking newly inaugurated President Washington to proclaim a
national day of thanksgiving, which he did on October 3, 1789,190
the first of several thanksgiving proclamations during his
administration.191
Relying chiefly on this legislative record, the Court in Marsh
upheld the Nebraska chaplaincy system, calling the history “un-
ambiguous and unbroken” and legally conclusive.192  In a similar
fashion, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on an “unbroken history
of official [religious] acknowledgement[s],” including Washing-
ton’s Thanksgiving Day proclamation, as support for government
displays of the Ten Commandments193 and the acknowledgement
of God in the Pledge of Allegiance.194  Two problems exist with
this line of analysis.  First, it presumes that legislative chaplain-
184 See DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 66, 73-77; WITTE, supra  note 36, at 72. R
185 DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 74-77. R
186 Id.  at 80-83.
187 See id.  at 83-88; WITTE, supra  note 36, at 72-73.
188 DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 76. R
189 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). See also DAVIS, supra  note 130, R
at 76-77.
190 George Washington, Proclamation:  A National Thanksgiving, (Oct. 3, 1789),
reprinted in  5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 94.
191 DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 90. R
192 Marsh , 463 U.S. at 792.
193 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2004) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring).
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cies and religious proclamations were static and noncontrover-
sial.  Yet, the Continental Congress created the legislative
chaplaincy in response to the urgencies of war and likely ex-
tended the office by default or with little thought.195  While a ma-
jority of officials likely supported legislative chaplaincies, some
disagreed with the practice:  John Jay and John Rutledge both
objected to the appointment of a chaplain by the Continental
Congress out of concern that it would show preference for some
faiths.196  James Madison also objected to the practice—albeit
much later, after leaving public office—arguing that “[t]he estab-
lishment of the chaplainship to Congs [sic] is a palpable violation
of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles.”197
Madison believed that “[r]eligious proclamations by the Execu-
tive recommending thanksgivings and fasts are shoots from the
same root” as chaplaincies.198
However, even if the majority of contemporaries approved of
the practices in isolation, that does not indicate that they ever
considered whether paid chaplaincies or religious proclamations
were consistent with the Establishment Clause.  Chaplaincies and
thanksgiving proclamations were carryovers from an earlier pe-
riod; the practices “were reflexive, even episodic; indeed, the evi-
dence from the proceedings of the First Congress gives little
indication that the constitutional legitimacy of these practices
were given more than a modicum of serious thought.”199  Justice
Souter has noted that the “practices prove, at best, that the
Framers simply did not share a common understanding of the
Establishment Clause, and, at worst, that they, like other politi-
cians, could raise constitutional ideals one day and turn their
backs on them the next.”200  Also, contemporaries familiar with
the more doctrinal actions of colonial governments viewed these
practices as being nondenominational and religiously inclusive in
character, particularly considering how limited religious diversity
was at the time.  George Washington made every effort to phrase
195 DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 91. R
196 Id.  at 73-74.
197 James Madison, Detached Memoranda (c. 1817), reprinted in  5 THE FOUN-
DERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 104-05 [hereinafter Madison, Detached
Memoranda]. Accord  Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10,
1822), reprinted in  5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra  note 104, at 105 (stating
that Madison disapproved of the action approving chaplains in 1789).
198 Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra  note 197, at 105. R
199 DAVIS, supra  note 130, at 223. R
200 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
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his religious proclamations and statements in inoffensive, generic
terms, avoiding references to Jesus Christ, and frequently using
deist terms for God.201  His letters later in life reveal a sensitivity
toward dissenting faiths and a commitment to religious equal-
ity.202  However, the purposeful inclusiveness behind such ac-
tions is lost when historical practices are used to validate
government preferences for particular belief systems, for which
Justice Scalia advocated in McCreary .203  In essence, the fact that
many of the Founders likely viewed these practices as innocuous,
considering their recent past (if they contemplated them at all),
does not mean that they would have viewed these practices as
being suited for the more religiously pluralistic twenty-first
century.
The ambiguity that results from relying on earlier acts and
practices as evidence of the Founders’ intent is also demonstrated
by the Northwest Land Ordinance of 1787, which was passed by
the Confederation Congress and reaffirmed by the First Congress
in 1791.  Some people have argued that language contained in
the third article of the Ordinance, stating that “[r]eligion, moral-
ity and knowledge [are] necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind,”204 indicates that Congress believed that
government relied on and was partially responsible for relig-
ion.205  In Wallace , Justice Rehnquist opined that this language
“confirm[s] the view that Congress did not mean that the Gov-
ernment should be neutral between religion and irreligion.”206
This language, however, must be read within the context of ear-
lier versions of the Ordinance, particularly the failed 1785 propo-
sal, which would have provided actual land grants “for the
support of religion.”207  Despite the efforts of pro-establishment
members from New England, Congress rejected both the public
support of religion and language encouraging “institutions for
the promotion of religion,” finally settling on the ultimate phra-
201 See, e.g. , Boller, supra  note 91, at 498. R
202 See id.  at 500-06.
203 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2754-55 (2005).
204 The Northwest Ordinance (July 13, 1787), reprinted in SOURCES AND DOCU-
MENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1764–1788, AND THE FORMA-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 226, 231 (Samuel E. Morison ed., 2d ed.
1965).
205 MALBIN, supra  note 13, at 14-15. R
206 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
207 See GAUSTAD, supra  note 11, at 151-56; Smith, supra  note 138, at 589-602. R
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seology.208  Although the final language was included to placate
the traditionalists, it is also likely that the compromise language
bothered few members, especially in light of the religious rheto-
ric common at that time.209  Clearly, though, the rhetoric had its
limits and Congress was unwilling to place any substance behind
the language of the Ordinance.210  Viewed in this context, the
Northwest Ordinance is not an endorsement of religion that un-
dermines the Everson  interpretation; rather, it depicts the pro-
gression of separationist thought during the period away from
the financial and symbolic support of religion.
CONCLUSION
The lure of history as a guide for constitutional adjudication is
irresistible.  History provides a powerful source of authority by
offering an aura of continuity and objectivity, which in turn legit-
imizes legal arguments and judicial decisionmaking.211  In a con-
stitutional democracy that embraces popular sovereignty as the
supreme authority, the understandings of those who drafted and
ratified the Constitution clearly matter.212  History also purport-
edly serves as an external constraint on judicial subjectivity by
providing an independent and apolitical source of information.213
208 See  Smith, supra  note 138, at 596-97, 601. R
209 See GAUSTAD, supra  note 11, at 152-56. R
210 See  Smith, supra  note 138, at 599, 601-02.  James Madison saw the attempted R
land grant as being akin to a religious establishment.  In a 1785 letter to James
Monroe, Madison wrote that he was glad that
Cong[ress] had expunged a clause contained in the first for setting apart a
district of land in each Township for supporting the Religion of the major-
ity of inhabitants.  How a regulation so unjust in itself, so foreign to the
Authority of Cong[ress], so hurtful to the sale of public land, and smelling
so strongly of antiquated Bigotry, could have received the countenance of a
[committee] is truly [a] matter of astonishment.
Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (May 29, 1785), in  2 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 1783–1787, at 143, 145 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
211 HOWE, supra  note 8, at 167-68. See also  H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for R
Originalists , 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 660 (1987) (“The exercise of antimajoritarian judi-
cial review is legitimate only when it can be shown to rest not on judicial choice but
on the preferences associated with an earlier (super-)majority through the ratifica-
tion or amendment processes.”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil , 57
U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854, 862 (1989) (emphasizing that judicial review must be
viewed as legitimate in a popular democracy).
212 See  Scalia, supra  note 211, at 854, 862 (arguing that originalism is “more com- R
patible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system”).
213 Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First
Amendment , 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 908 (1993).  One of the few points upon which
Justice Scalia and Erwin Chemerinsky apparently agree is that judges strive to pro-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 37  7-MAR-07 11:17
2006] Separationism as an Idea 479
Modern constitutional theory can thus be described, in the words
of Larry Kramer, as “‘Founding obsessed’ in its use of his-
tory.”214  The Founding has become that incomparable and semi-
nal event in American history, such that we treat it as “conclusive
and sacred” and the Constitution’s authors and ratifiers as “spe-
cial and privileged” in their apparent understanding of its
contents.215
[W]e ask about these Foundings because what the Founders
thought binds us today, or because we need to translate their
assumptions and values to present circumstances, or in order
to synthesize them with commitments made during other
Foundings, the historical inquiry in constitutional interpreta-
tion is disproportionately devoted to understanding these dis-
crete moments.216
Not only do we treat the Founding as sacred and unique, we
tend to view it as a static and completed event.  It is as if all
human knowledge and wisdom came together for one brief, fif-
teen-year moment; as if long-developing notions of democracy,
freedom, equality, and religious freedom reached their apex be-
tween 1775 and 1790 and ceased developing, particularly from
the perspective of the Founders.  The Founding, it seems, is that
moment in time at which the Founders “bequeathed their values
and deeds to the present.”217  Our job as judges and lawyers is
merely to discover and then apply those settled understandings
of church–state separation.
This Article argues that this view of the Founding period is
wrong, and that the Founders understood that they lived in a dy-
namic period and expressed ideas and ideals that were yet to be
achieved.  Religious liberty and separation of church and state,
concepts that had been percolating for many years, were tried
out on a scale never before experienced.  As the states experi-
mented with different versions of separation, weighing those con-
cepts against earlier and existing practices, attitudes developed.
Because separation was an unfolding idea, no single document or
practice accurately encapsulated the concept.  For that very rea-
duce decisions that appear to derive support from external sources as opposed to
personal opinion. Compare id.  at 908, with  Scalia, supra  note 211, at 862. R
214 Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And Through It , 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1627, 1628 (1997).
215 Id.  at 1627-28.
216 Id.  at 1628.
217 CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 175
(1969).
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son, none of the Founders would have been willing to restrict the
concept to the situation existing at any particular time, including
their own.  They would have eschewed the modern tendency to
cabin the idea of separation by referring to particular practices or
states, particularly as a means to proof-text modern practices and
actions.
This does not mean that history provides no guidance.  Recur-
ring and consistent statements that reflect broad principles or
points of consensus can be instructive for modern application of
the Religion Clauses.  Those principles that emerge from state
disestablishment and the debates surrounding ratification and
the drafting of the Bill of Rights include concerns for rights of
conscience, no-compelled support of religion, no-delegation of
government authority to religious institutions, and equal treat-
ment of all sects.218  However, “our use of the history of their
time must limit itself to broad principles, not specific prac-
tices.”219  By so doing, we can view church–state separation as
the Founders viewed it:  as a “spacious conception” and an un-
folding idea.
218 These values are discussed in more detail in Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal
Jurisprudential Pedigree:  Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separa-
tionism , 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111 (2002).
219 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
